Transfer of prisoners: anti-shuttling provisions: Article III, d) and Article IV, point e), contain similar provisions that require that: “If the hearing is not provided for by a charge, information or complaint before the prisoner is returned to the original place of detention, so that this charge, information or complaint no longer has force or effect, and the court makes a decision that concludes the same , unless the United States has jurisdiction and includes notification and the possibility of being heard in accordance with Section 9 of the agreement. [Article IV, point e) ] It was found that the “trial” included a conviction in this context. See Walker v. King, 448 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The department did not accept this decision as a correct interpretation of the law. However, in order to avoid litigation and the risk of reversal of proceedings, the return of prisoners should be postponed to the period following the imposition of the sentence or a section 9 hearing. However, if the dismissal of an indictment is requested on the basis of the return of a prisoner before the conviction, it should be opposed. Applicability of the agreement: the agreement applies only to “a person (who) has imposed a prison sentence in a prison or prison institute” (Articles III bis) and IV, point a)) and is therefore not applicable to a person detained awaiting trial. See UNITED States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711-12 (9.

Cir.), cert. United States v Evans, 423 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff`d, 556 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1977). Since the agreement applies only to an inmate based on a spent “charge, information or complaint” requiring “procedure” (Article III A) and IV, point a), the agreement does not apply to an inmate on the basis of a parole warrant. See Reed, supra. The parole procedure is presented in 18 United States.C 4214 (b). The agreement also does not apply to probation agreements.

See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985). Extradition rights under national law: To Cuyler v.