Ensuring a fairer deal for the UK fishing industry is a manifesto promise and one of the government`s main brexit objectives. On 2 July 2017, the UK government announced its withdrawal from the fisheries agreement. [6] [7] [9] The next day, July 3, 2017, the “delation” was officially announced. [5] The New Scientist noted that this was probably the first time that a country had withdrawn from an international agreement bearing the name of its own capital. [10] With respect to your first question, I agree that the best way to achieve effective cooperation with respect to common stocks is a comprehensive mutual access regime. This is not necessarily a continuous application of the CFP as a whole, but could be a little closer to the EU agreements on access to the north. Within such a system, there is some flexibility for political changes that repair the weaknesses of the CFP. If the UK decides to close access completely, it is likely that the loss of efficiency will have to be offset by an increased cooperative effort to ensure sustainable management of common stocks. I don`t want to speculate on what exactly it would look like. Similarly, UNCLOS discourages coastal states from establishing an authorized catch that is exactly in line with its fishing capacity. That is why, at best, we can speak of “relative rights” under section 62, paragraph 3. If the UK chooses to grant access to states other than the EU Member States traditionally involved in the future, EU Member States could only argue that the UK acted in bad faith in exercising its discretion. However, the coastal state`s discretionary decision is excluded from the scope of mandatory dispute resolution under Part XV of the UNDC (see Article 297, paragraph 3, point a), and is only subject to a Schedule V conciliation (see Article 297, paragraph 3, paragraph b), point of .B ii).

It can be concluded that EU Member States will not have the right to access fishing at sea in the UK and the EEZ under UNCLOS, once the UK has “liberated” from the CFP and the CFL. In a 2016 legal opinion commissioned by the Scottish Fishermen`s Federation, Robin Churchill estimates that the CFL is effectively no longer in force (points 7 to 13). Its arguments are based on Article 30, paragraphs 3 and 59, of the 1969 Vienna Convention on treaty law (VCLT) and generally address the incompatibility of UNCLOS as a subsequent contract with the LFC, which deals with the same subject (see also Article 311, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS). These are interesting legal issues that deserve attention (and I am not sure I fully agree with the outcome), but I will refrain from discussing them here. In any event, the question of whether the CFL is a dormant or dead “dinosaur” that announced its resignation from the CFL on July 3, 2017, pursuant to section 15, is under discussion. As the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is also retained the LFC, I could not help noticing that it carefully recorded the UK termination notification in the status file on the same day. In particular, the denunciation is subject to conditions. It comes into effect after the two-year period under section 15 of the CFL expires. However, if the UK`s withdrawal from the EU were to be completed at a later date, in accordance with Article 50 of the TUE, the denunciation would take effect at a later date.

For now, Brexit is expected to come into force on 29 March 2019 if no agreement is reached by then. The two-year section 15 period of the CFL expires in July 2019. Thus, the conditional text of the communication on dismissal seems to take into account the possibility of a deferred Brexit. Because the historical rights under the CFL are contractual, they do not exist independently of the CFL.